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The Compatibility of Corporate Exit Taxation with
European Law
Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belasting-
dienstRijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, Judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) of 29 November 2011, not yet reported
by
Thomas Biermeyer*, Fabio Elsener** and Fiona Timba***
In National Grid the CJEU confirmed that exit taxes on unrealised capital gains of corpo-
rations upon emigration to another Member State constitute a restriction on the freedom of
establishment. The Court found that these exit taxes could be justified, however, and set out
the conditions upon which this could be possible.
This article begins by briefly summarising the ambiguity that had surrounded this matter
before this decision and then summarises the arguments of the Court, highlighting the cir-
cumstances under which such taxation might be compatible with EU law. Lastly, the com-
mentary discusses the conformity of the Court’s findings with international tax law and
European internal market law as well as the implications of the judgement on the Commis-
sion Communication on Exit Taxation, on cross-border mergers and on company seat trans-
fers.
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I. Introduction
On 29 November 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union put
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vard Law School.
** Fabio Elsener, Business Law Master, University of Zurich and European Law School
Master, Maastricht University.
*** Fiona Timba, QueenMaryUniversity, London (LLB), Barrister, European Law School,
Maastricht University.
forward its view on the permissibility of exit taxation on unrealised capital
gains that result from a company’s migration to another Member State. This
ended the previous ambiguity regarding whether cross-border transactions of
companies, particularly seat transfers, can trigger an exit tax on unrealised
capital gains. Exit taxes levied on unrealised capital gains were considered
one of the major obstacles to corporate mobility within the EU internal mar-
ket. As such1, the clarificatory judgment was highly anticipated.
The permissibility of this type of exit taxation had been ambiguous since the
Court of Justice addressed the matter in Lasteyrie du Saillant2 andN3 in 2004
and 2006, respectively. In both cases, the Court determined that an immediate
tax on the income of individuals which had not yet been realised hinders the
freedom of establishment and, as such, violates Article 49 of the TFEU. How-
ever, these cases concerned natural persons rather than legal ones. In its 2006
Communication on exit taxation4, the European Commission argued that
these Court of Justice rulings must also be applied to exit taxes levied against
migrating companies, a view that had been shared by many academics5. How-
ever, the CJEU had not yet confirmed this and, depending on the interpreta-
tion of the Cartesio6 judgment in relation to the Daily Mail7 judgment on
corporate seat transfers, one could not be certain whether the matter indeed
fell within the freedom of establishment8.
1 See e.g. the Commission point of view in the infringement proceedings against Member
States: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1565&type=
HTML;G. Burwitz, ‘Tax Consequences of theMigration of Companies: A Practitioner’s
Perspective’, European Business Organization Law Review 7 (2006), p. 594.
2 C-9/02Hughes de Lasteyrie du Salliant [2004] ECR I-2409, para. 47. See on this case for
example G. Parleani, ‘Relocation and Taxation: The EuropeanCourt of Justice Disallows
the French Rule of Direct Taxation of Unrealised Gains’, 1 ECFR (2004), p. 379–389.
3 C-470/04Nv Inspecteur van de BelastingdienstOost/kantoorAlmelo [2006] ECR I-7409.
4 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee – Exit taxation and the need for co-ordina-
tion of Member States’ tax policies, COM(2006) 825 final.
5 See e.g. B. Angelette, ‘The Revolution that Never Came and the Revolution Coming-De
Lasteyrie Du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the Changing Corporate Law
in Europe’, Virginia law review 92 (2006) p. 1198; C.Panayi, ‘Corporate Mobility in the
European Union and Exit Taxes’, Bulletin for International Taxation (October 2009),
p. 471; D. Zernova, Exit Taxes on Companies in the Context of the EU Internal Market,
39 Intertax10 (2011), p. 482; R. Kok, Compatibility of Exit Taxes and Community Law,
20 EC Tax Review 2 (2011).
6 C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I-09641.
7 Case 81/87 R vHMTreasury andCommissioners of Inland Revenue, ex pDailyMail and
General Trust plc.[1988] ECR 5483.
8 M. Szydlo, ‘The Right of Companies to Cross-Border Conversion under the TFEU
Rules on Freedom of Establishment’, 7 ECFR 3 (2010), particularly p. 435–441; A. Wis-
niewski and A. Opalski, ‘Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio
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Furthermore, provisions made a tax neutral transfer possible if the assets
remained connected to a permanent establishment located in the home Mem-
ber State9 regarding cross-border transactions with regard to mergers or in the
framework of the European Company (SE). However, it was unclear to what
extent exit taxation remained permissible if the assets were no longer con-
nected to a permanent establishment10.
Legal clarity was not only necessary for corporate actors, but also for national
authorities, who were uncertain as to what extent their domestic legislation
violated EU law. As both the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Author-
ity have begun infringement proceedings against severalMember States on exit
tax legislation, the outcome of this judgment is decisive for the respective
litigation strategies11.
Although National Grind relates chiefly to European tax law, it does involve
the transfer of the company’s place of effective management and therefore,
allows some preliminary conclusions as to the uncertainty regarding the in-
terpretation and the scope of Cartesio, the 2008 judgment on company seat
transfers. It thus adds to the recently published Opinion of the Advocate
General Jääskinen in Vale, which concerns the seat transfer saga of the Court
of Justice12.
As a consequence, having summarised the facts and the reasoning of theCourt,
Judgment’,European Business Organization LawReview 10 (2009), pp. 595–625; A. De
Sousa, ‘Company’s Cross-border Transfer of Seat in the EU after Cartesio’, Jean Mon-
net Working Paper No. 7(2009); see also a comment by the legal counsel in the cases
Cartesio and Vale: V. Korom, P. Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies:
The European Court of Justice Confirms and Refines its Daily Mail Decision in the
Cartesio Case C-210/06’, 6 ECFR 1 (2009), p. 125–160.
9 See Articles 10b, 10c and 10d of Council Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005,
[2005]OJ L 58/19, amendingDirective 90/434/EECofAugust 1990 (MergerDirective),
OJ L 225/1.
10 Though, one has to state that in such a case an exit tax seems in any event incompre-
hensible. The objective of an exit tax is to tax unrealised capital gains before they become
un-taxable. If the assets remain within the Permanent Establishment as defined under
the respective law and the double taxation conventions of the respectiveMember States,
they also remain taxable in that Member State.
11 The Commission started proceedings against Sweden in 2008, against Portugal and
Spain in 2009 and against Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands in 2010. The EFTA
Surveillance Authority gave a final warning on this matter to Norway in 2011.
12 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-378/10 VALE, delivered on 15
December 2011. See on the seat transfer cases for example H.J. de Kluiver, Inspiring a
New European Company Law, 1 ECFR (2004), p. 121–134; W. Schön, ‘The Mobility of
Compromise in Europe and the Organizational Freedom of Company Founders’, 3
ECFR 2 (2006), p. 122–146.
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a comment will be given on the issue of exit taxation followed by a short
remark regarding the topic of seat transfers within the EU.
II. Facts
National Grid Indus (‘NGI’) was a Dutch incorporated and tax-resident com-
pany that since June 1996 has had a claim of GBP 33,113,00 against National
Grid Company plc., a company established in the United Kingdom. On 15
December 2000 NGI transferred its place of effective management to the
United Kingdom.Due to the rise of the pound sterling against the Dutch
guilder an unrealised exchange rate gain was generated on that claim. In ac-
cordance with the applicable double-tax treaty, NGI became aUK tax resident
and ceased to exist for taxation purposes in the Netherlands as a consequence
of the transfer of place of effective management. The national law of the
Netherlands required final settlement of tax on unrealised capital gains at
the time and the Dutch Inspector decided that NGI should be taxed on the
exchange rate gain. NGI appealed this decision and following a second appeal
the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Regional Court of Appeal, Amsterdam) made a
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union asking-
whether final settlement without possibility of deferment or taking into ac-
count subsequent decreases in value was contrary to Article 49 TFEU.
III. Findings of the court
TheCourt approached the case in the followingway: It first answeredwhether
a company transferring its place of effective management to another Member
State can rely on Article 49 TFEU against that Member State. Following that,
it analysed whether the exit tax is in violation of the freedom of establishment
and last it examined whether the Dutch legislation can be justified.
Regarding the first point the Court explained that it was stipulated inCartesio
that a Member State can determine the connecting factors required of a com-
pany to be incorporated under its national law. It can thus place restrictions on
the transfer of such a connecting factor if the company seeks to remain in-
corporated under the Member State’s company law. However, in National
Grid the transfer of the place of effective management to the United Kingdom
did not affect the status of the company and consequently the transfer did not
affect the possibility of relying via Article 54 TFEU on Article 49 TFEU13.
Next the Court examined whether the exit tax restricts the freedom of estab-
13 See paragraphs 22–33 of the judgment.
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lishment and reasoned that such an exit tax puts a company at a disadvantage in
terms of cash flow compared to a company retaining its place of effective
management in the Netherlands. The difference in treatment is liable to deter
a Dutch company from transferring its place of effective management to an-
otherMember State14. The difference of treatment can also not be explained by
objective differences in situation15. As a consequence, according to the Court,
the exit tax constitutes a restriction on the free movement of establishment16.
Following this the Court analysed whether there is justification for this re-
striction. It noted that the legislation is justified by the objective of ensuring
the balanced allocation of powers of taxation of Member States since that
legislation intends to prevent circumstances capable of jeopardising the right
of that Member State to exercise its power of taxation regarding activities
carried out on its territory. Furthermore, the Court found that the legislation
is appropriate to do so17,as the CJEU put it, ‘[u]nrealised capital gains relating
to an economic asset are thus taxed in theMember State in which they arose.’18
Finally, the question arose whether the legislation went beyond what was
necessary to attain the objective. The Court split this question into two parts:
First, it looked at the issue of the definitive establishment of the amount of tax
at the time when the company transferred its place of effective management
without taking into account losses that may occur after the transfer. Second, it
addressed whether an immediate recovery of the tax at the time of the transfer
goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective.
Regarding the first issue, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that
establishing the amount of tax at the moment of transfer can be in conformity
with the principle of proportionality. In order to safeguard the exercise of its
powers of taxation, theMember Statecan determine the tax due at the moment
that its power of taxation ceases to exist. In accordance with the principle of
fiscal territoriality, it is for the host Member State to monitorin its tax system
fluctuations in the value of the company assets which arise after the home
Member State loses its fiscal connection with the company. Consideration of
the gains or losses by the home Member State could call into question the
balanced allocation of powers of taxation between theMember States and lead
to double taxation or double losses19.
Regarding the second matter, whether the immediate recovery of the tax goes
14 Paragraph 37 of the judgment.
15 Paragraph 38 of the judgment.
16 Paragraph 41 of the judgment.
17 Paragraphs 46–48 of the judgment.
18 Paragraph 48 of the judgment.
19 Paragraphs 52 to 59 of the judgment.
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beyond what is necessary, the focus is on the question of whether the alter-
native, a deferred recovery,would involve an excessive burden both for the
company and for the tax authority. The Court stated that a deferred recovery
may avoid cash-flow problems which could otherwise arise for the company.
However, it also acknowledged that corporate asset situations can be so com-
plex that tracing these assets may lead to an excessive burden for the company
which could be as harmful to the freedom of establishment as an immediate
exit tax20.
The conclusion that the Court reached was that less restrictive legislation
would be possible for examplelegislation that gives companies the choice
between an immediate payment of the tax and a deferred payment, the latter
‘possibly together with interest in accordance with the applicable national
legislation’. Furthermore, it was stated that account should be taken of the
risk of non-recovery and this could be areason why a Member State might be
allowed to ask for the provision of a bank guarantee21. Finally, the Court noted
that a deferred payment would not be an excessive burden for the Member
States. Based on the Mutual Assistance Directive22 Member States can obtain
information on whether or not the company has realised certain assets in the
host Member State23.
IV. Comments
After this judgment it is clear to Member States that domestic legislation
requiring companies to pay an immediate exit tax on unrealised capital gains
in the event of corporate migration is in violation of European law. In that
respectthe judgment confirms the case law in Lasteyrie du Saillant and N.
However, the essence of the judgment is not that exit taxation is prohibited.
Whilst such legislation may well be in violation of the freedom of establish-
ment24provisions imposing such taxes can be justified based on the basis of the
preservation of the allocation of powers of taxation between Member States25.
The importance of the judgment lies in its definition of a proportionate exit
tax. First, Member States may calculate the taxable capital gain atthe moment
of emigration and do not have to take – in contrast to the case law inN. – later
20 Paragraphs 68–70 of the judgment.
21 Paragraph 74 of the judgment.
22 Directive 2008/55 EC on the mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to
certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, [2008] OJ L 150/28.
23 Paragraph 78 of the judgment.
24 Paragraph 41 of the judgment.
25 Paragraph 48 of the judgment.
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losses into account26. Second, Member States must allow deferred payment
tothe moment of actual realisation of the capital but can raise fees for the
additional administrative burden and interests for the durationof the delayed
payment.
With regards to both aspects the judgment reflects conformity with both
European internal market law and international tax law. Whilst freedom of
establishment is one of the mechanisms to ensure an internal market without
unjustified barriersit is at the same time a principle that the common market
freedoms do not guarantee tax neutral corporate emigration27. As both the
Advocate General in the case and the Court reasoned, the objective of the
internal market has to be balanced against domestic considerations such asa
Member State’s power of taxation in relation tocapital gains within that Mem-
ber State. Therefore, it is proportionate to determine the tax duewhen the state
loses its power of taxation28.
In terms of international tax lawthe country of residence has,under theOECD
Model Convention,the exclusive right to tax capital gains29.Under most dou-
ble taxation treaties a state has no power to tax the income of a former resident
after emigration. Consequently, a state is conflicting with the standards of
international taxation if it takes into account post-emigration alterations of
the capital gains for determining the tax basis of an exit tax as wassuggested in
N.National Grid corrects this requirement and brings the case law of the
CJEU into accordance with international tax treaties.
The risk that refusal to take post-emigration losses into account for the cal-
culation of the deferred exit taxation would lead to disadvantageous results
compared to regular taxation of capital gains is further negligible: Due to the
taxation of unrealised capital gains upon emigration the assets can be re-valued
and thus the opening balance sheet for tax purposes in thehoststate would
enter the assets at this re-assessed market value.Subsequent losses on these
assets couldbe set-off in the hoststate, which compensates for the disadvan-
26 One also has to note that in this respect, the caseN is different. An essential difference is
the possibility to set off post-emigrational losses. Whilst this is usually possible for
companies individuals may not always be allowed to do so, particularly if their partic-
ipation is not seen as business assets by the tax authorities of the host Member State, but
as private investment. Therefore, the comparability is limited to situations where the
emigrated person is able to deduct post-emigrational losses.
27 C-365/02 Lindfors [2004] ECR I-7183, para. 34; C-403/03 Schemp [2005] ECR I-6421,
para. 45.
28 Paragraph 52 of the judgment; points 55 and 56 of theOpinion of the AdvocateGeneral.
29 Cf. the prospective Articles 7, 13 and 21 OECD Model Convention; in detail on the
qualification of exit taxes under the OECD Model Convention Fernando de Man/
TiiuAlbin, Contradicting Views of Exit Taxation under OECD MC and TFEU: Are
Exit Taxes Still Allowed in Europe?, Intertax 39/12 (2011), p. 618 et seq.
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tages of taxation atthe higher unrealised value rather than the actual final
value30.In addition, the re-valuation of assets and liabilities leads to a higher
depreciationbasisthat could correspondingly be used to lower the tax exposure
in the host state31.A disadvantage could only arise if further losses weretermi-
nal, meaning that they could notbe taken into account in the hoststate. The
Court heldin Marks& Spencer thatterminal losses have to be taken into ac-
count in order not to infringe the freedom of capital32. However, it referred to
the non-comparable situation where the losses of a subsidiary have to be taken
into account in the parent’s state, whereas presently the losses would have to
be taken into account for a company that ceased to exist for tax purposes and
thus, could notclaim any tax benefits. Yet, such disadvantageswould arisefrom
disparities between the national tax systems of Member States that are, as long
as such rules are not discriminatory, not regarded as infringing the common
market freedoms and couldlegitimately lead to disadvantageous taxation upon
emigration33.
In taking this stance on exit taxation, the judgment also clarified the position of
the Commission Communication on exit taxation and the ambiguity sur-
rounding exit taxation on cross-border mergers or in relation to SEs if the
assets do not remain connected to the permanent establishment. As already
stated, contrary to the Commission Communicationthe Court ruled that a
deferred payment does not have to take into account any changes in value of
the assets after emigration34. Furthermore, since the Court upholds the Mem-
ber States’ competence in defining such conditions, the present judgment does
not help to resolve mismatches of the tax basis due to different valuation
methods of assets in the emigrating and immigrating country that could lead
to problems of double (non-)taxation35.Concerning cross-border mergers and
SEs, Directive 2005/19/EC grants tax neutrality in the form of a deferral only
if the assets remain in a permanent establishment of the former home state. If
30 This possibility to set-off post-emigration losses is regarded as the central issue for the
proportionality of a deferred exit taxation that does not take future losses into account
(para. 58 of the Judgment; point. 88 of the Opinion of the Advocate General). Its
conditions and limits are a Member States’ competence (point 78 of the Opinion of
the Advocate General).
31 Cf. B. Terra/P. Wattel, European Tax Law, 5th Ed., Alphen a/d Rijn Kluwer Law
International, 2008, p. 789.
32 C-446/03Marks & Spencer II [2005] ECR I-10837, para.55. See on this case also R. Seer,
‘The ECJ on the Verge of aMember State Friendly Judicature’, 3ECFR 3 (2006), p. 237–
247.
33 C-403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421, para. 45; in detail B. Terra/P. Wattel (op. cit.),
p. 68 et seq.
34 Cf. Communication of 19 December 2006, Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination
of Member States’ tax policies, COM(2006) 825 final, p. 6.
35 Cf. Communication of 19 December 2006 (op. cit.), p. 7 et seq.).
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the Member State however loses its right of taxation, it now follows from
National Grid that domestic direct taxation legislation regarding mergers
and SEs has to comply with the conditions stipulated in this judgment.
As can be seen theCourtmanaged to end the ambiguity regarding exit taxation
on cross-border transactions of companies. Nevertheless, it will be interesting
to see how national courts will approach the limitations to the conditions
stipulated by the Court. In particular regarding the licit interest rate it is
unclear ifthe interest rate of a Member Statethat exceeds the recovery of in-
flationwill be disproportionate.The additional costs could be a prohibitive
barrier to opt for a deferred payment and a deferred payment should not be
regarded as delayed payment, since without the emigration the taxes would
not have been due earlier. Therefore, any penalty-interest rates for the delay
seem inappropriate.
To close this case-note, a short comment on company seat transfers is required.
After the Cartesio judgment in 2008, there has been considerable discussion
about the interpretation of this case: whether, and if so in how far, the judg-
ment overruled or confirmed the Daily Mail judgment from 1988 on out-
bound seat transfers in which it was stipulated that the freedom of establish-
ment is not applicable on seat transfers36. The pending case VALE will
hopefully clarify this matter completely37. However, seeing the Opinion of
Advocate General Jääskinen in this case, the Court might well not be able to
do so because it is possible that the CJEU finds that the company in this case
will not be able to rely on the freedom of establishment38.
Contrary to the arguments of the intervening Member States39, the judgment
at hand clarifies that Daily Mail has finally been brought to its grave.Out-
bound seat transfers do not per se fall outside of the scope of Article 49
36 See e.g. C. Gerner-Beuerle andM. Schillig, ‘TheMysteries of Freedom of Establishment
after Cartesio’ (2010), 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2 (2010),
p. 303–323; V. Korom, P. Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies: The
EuropeanCourt of Justice Confirms and Refines its DailyMail Decision in the Cartesio
Case C-210/06’, 6 ECFR 1 (2009), p. 147–152; J. Bohrenkämper, ‘Corporate mobility
across European Borders: Still no Freedomof Emigration forCompanies?‘, inEuropean
Law Reporter 3 (2009); M. Szydlo, ‘The Right of Companies to Cross-Border Con-
version under the TFEU Rules on Freedom of Establishment’, 7 ECFR 3 (2010), p. 424
et seq. See further Case C 81/87 Daily Mail [1988] ECR 05483, para. 24–25.
37 Case C-378/10 VALE, pending, lodged on July 28, 2010, not yet reported.
38 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-378/10 VALE, delivered on 15
December 2011, points 43 to 52. Due to deregistration from the commercial register,
the company did not exist anymore under the law of the Member State of origin (Italy)
at the time of registration in Hungary.
39 Para. 29 of the judgment; point 19 of the Opinion of the Advocate General.
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TFEU40.ConfirmingCartesio,Member States have the power to determine the
conditions required by a company for it to be incorporated under its law. For
example, for Member States following the incorporation theory it confirms
that they can require companies incorporated on their territory to have the
registered office within their territory41.Outbound transfers of the registered
office would therefore not fall within the scope of Article 49 TFEU if the
company seeks to remain under the company law of this State42.However,
being incorporated under the national law of a Member State allows a com-
panyto be able to rely, via Article 54 TFEU, on the right to freedom of
establishment. Thus, any further conditions, such as legislation on winding
up orimposing an exit tax, will potentially be in violation of Article 49 TFEU if
it restricts the freedom of establishment of the company and is not justifiable.
Nevertheless, the outcome in the case Valewill be instrumentalin this discus-
sion.National Grid did not clarify the obiter dictum of theCartesio judgment
dealing with the question of whether, and if so under which circumstances, a
Member State has to allow an inbound company conversion, meaning a com-
pany transferring its seat into the territory of this Member State and incorpo-
rating under its law43. This part of the judgment is at hand in the Vale case and
for reasons of legal certainty on the overall scope of the possibility of corpo-
rate migration, it is hoped that the Court of Justice will deal with this matter in
the pending case.
40 Compare with para. 24–25 of Case C 81/87 Daily Mail.
41 See on this matter e.g. M. Szydlo, ‘The Right of Companies to Cross-Border Conver-
sion under the TFEU Rules on Freedom of Establishment’, 7 ECFR 3 (2010), p. 425.
42 This would be the situation under scrutiny in the Cartesio case.
43 Case C-210/06 Cartesio, para. 111–112.
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